Russia, and the coup
Jun. 24th, 2023 11:15 pm This is going to be a bit slapdash, and I need to write up more detail for my Patreon (which is free... I can't be arsed to presume I'm worth forcing people to pay money to read me; not least because that limits my effective ability to share things, and anything important will end up being open to all because timely).
I expected something like this; and the writing has been on the wall for... at least 6 months (I'd have to trawl my twitter to find out when I first intimated I was expecting it; so that's a plus for long form platforms).
Prigozhin is a symptom of a rotteness in the state of Denmark. The king will die; and there no one, nor any method, to replace him.
Everything else which played out in this little dance up the M4 toward Moscow is probably predicate on that problem (and not seeing that is a large part of why so many people were caught flatfooted and are dumbfounded at the apparent resolution). Putin has successor; and he alone is running things.
There no equivalent of the Communist Party; and nothing like the PolitBuro. Apres Putin, the deluge. So there are lot of people wondering how to ride out that storm; Prigozhin is (or was) one of them. But Putin had put him in a bind. EVERYONE knows who he is. And Putin's Ukrainian Adventure was put on his shoulders. If the War fails... he's toast. And he knows better than perhaps anyone how likely a failure is.
So he tried to steer public opinion; by saying MOD was shortchanging him, and then saying they should declare "Mission Accomplished" and commit an Armistice in the hope Ukraine could be forced to accept the new status quo. That's a non-starter. Putin is probably perfectly willing to take what he's got and call it a day; but Ukraine has to concede defeat; and offer it, or he won't stop trying to attrit to victory.
So the criticisms of Putin started to rankle. It's also true that the Russian military is a command and control nightmare. There are at least three didn't command chains, and as I understand it at least three different comms networks. That's not the biggest problem; the biggest problem is Putin had been using Wagner to use his power abroad; and to do that he had given them more than small arms and some armored cars. He created an army group (Russian Style, what the US would think of as a Corps). Russian Army Groups are combined arms units. They are why we created the AirLand Battle doctrine. They come with integrated Air Support (because the USSR, sensibly didn't make their Air Force an independent entity).
Those assets are Putin's property, but not in his actual control. The people in Wagner answer to Prigozhin, not Putin. Putin pays for them; and provide all their gear and supply, but their Loyalties are to Mother Russia, and Prigozhin; because the legal fiction is they are an independent military contractor. But they only have one client (which isn't that uncommon; if the US hadn't been contracting with Blackwater in 2004, it would never have become more than a large private security company; and they never really had any other Paramilitary Mission clients).
Being a PMC is a strange beast. People imagine mercenaries in some strange place between Europe's late renaissance, and the French Foreign Legion. The former is all but dead (the Swiss Guard at the Vatican being the only remnant of that model), and the Soldier of Fortune romanticised in the '80s from the post-war colonial wars of retention in the '60s never were.
Modern mercenaries are hired thugs who outgun the locals and destabilise the area they are in; think Warren Zevon's song "Jungle Work*" They accept the risk of death for a better than average paycheck (based on where they live). But unlike soldiers, who accept they are expendable; and rely on their gov't to not waste their lives. Mercenaries don't see themselves in that way. The risks they are willing to run are very different; and if the likelihood of death is too high, they quit.
Wagner is a hybrid. They know they are actually an arm of Putin's ambitions; but they've been sent places where the risks are low. Until they were committed to Ukraine. The reason for the recruiting in prisons was to keep the actual soldiers from getting killed in mass charges. But that was only going to work for so long.
That's why Prigozhin was so bellicose about needing more ammo. He didn't mean bullet, he meant artillery, and armor. He has troops who are capable of adapting with reasonable speed; because a lot of them had some experience in Syria, where it's not a one sided shooting gallery.
Problem is Putin wanted something hard to come by; a victory with no hero. Wagner was the only force doing well (if the grinding destruction of Bakhmut could be considered to have "gone well"), but the problem of Putin's succession is ever on his mind ("uneasy lies the head that wears the crown" and all that) means he can't have someone else get a Triumph.
There is also a lot of jockeying in the MoD because nothing is going well. Shoigu is ever at risk of being the next scapegoat (and I think the only reason he's still there is no is willing to accept the risk of being the next failure. Each replacement ups the stakes), etc. So the plan was made to absorb Wagner into the Army; thus removing Prigozhin's relevance/power/income, and THREAT.
So, push came to shove. Someone else might have bolted. Trusted to enough money stashed abroad, and headed someplace safe. But there is no such place. I'm not sure there is anyplace he can go, which is both within reach, and won't extradite him. That's independent of the problem of Putin sending people to kill him. The only other choice was what happened.
Now it's being called a show of force, and attempt to shake up the people keeping the real situation from Putin and demonstrate his loyalty. It wasn't. It was an attempted coup. It went as coups usually do; when they aren't committed without opposition/near the Head of State. An attack was made; everyone got very nervous, most people sat on the sidelines and waited to see who was going to blink first.
The lack of immediate flocking to his banner made Prigozhin decide it wasn't going to work; and I suspect Lukashenko helped that happen by convincing Putin that a lack of immediate force would keep Wagner from feeling cornered. Putin, by not pulling out all the stop managed to look neither scared, nor weak; and avoided tipping his hand. He needed to put Prigozhin in a less liminal space, to remove the romantic aspect, and prevent any appearance of possible success.
What happens next? Prigozhin goes into exile. The troops who moved on Moscow get sent to penal battalions; and probably sent to die in mass assaults. Wagnerites who held the line during the coup get absorbed into the regular army; thus dissolving Wagner (and they probably get broken up, to avoid loci of disaffection).
After that... things are murky. Belarus is an interesting prison, and how Putin takes his revenge isn't clear, but Prigozhin will be made an example of.
*Track 3 on Bad Luck Streak in Dancing School, released 1980
I expected something like this; and the writing has been on the wall for... at least 6 months (I'd have to trawl my twitter to find out when I first intimated I was expecting it; so that's a plus for long form platforms).
Prigozhin is a symptom of a rotteness in the state of Denmark. The king will die; and there no one, nor any method, to replace him.
Everything else which played out in this little dance up the M4 toward Moscow is probably predicate on that problem (and not seeing that is a large part of why so many people were caught flatfooted and are dumbfounded at the apparent resolution). Putin has successor; and he alone is running things.
There no equivalent of the Communist Party; and nothing like the PolitBuro. Apres Putin, the deluge. So there are lot of people wondering how to ride out that storm; Prigozhin is (or was) one of them. But Putin had put him in a bind. EVERYONE knows who he is. And Putin's Ukrainian Adventure was put on his shoulders. If the War fails... he's toast. And he knows better than perhaps anyone how likely a failure is.
So he tried to steer public opinion; by saying MOD was shortchanging him, and then saying they should declare "Mission Accomplished" and commit an Armistice in the hope Ukraine could be forced to accept the new status quo. That's a non-starter. Putin is probably perfectly willing to take what he's got and call it a day; but Ukraine has to concede defeat; and offer it, or he won't stop trying to attrit to victory.
So the criticisms of Putin started to rankle. It's also true that the Russian military is a command and control nightmare. There are at least three didn't command chains, and as I understand it at least three different comms networks. That's not the biggest problem; the biggest problem is Putin had been using Wagner to use his power abroad; and to do that he had given them more than small arms and some armored cars. He created an army group (Russian Style, what the US would think of as a Corps). Russian Army Groups are combined arms units. They are why we created the AirLand Battle doctrine. They come with integrated Air Support (because the USSR, sensibly didn't make their Air Force an independent entity).
Those assets are Putin's property, but not in his actual control. The people in Wagner answer to Prigozhin, not Putin. Putin pays for them; and provide all their gear and supply, but their Loyalties are to Mother Russia, and Prigozhin; because the legal fiction is they are an independent military contractor. But they only have one client (which isn't that uncommon; if the US hadn't been contracting with Blackwater in 2004, it would never have become more than a large private security company; and they never really had any other Paramilitary Mission clients).
Being a PMC is a strange beast. People imagine mercenaries in some strange place between Europe's late renaissance, and the French Foreign Legion. The former is all but dead (the Swiss Guard at the Vatican being the only remnant of that model), and the Soldier of Fortune romanticised in the '80s from the post-war colonial wars of retention in the '60s never were.
Modern mercenaries are hired thugs who outgun the locals and destabilise the area they are in; think Warren Zevon's song "Jungle Work*" They accept the risk of death for a better than average paycheck (based on where they live). But unlike soldiers, who accept they are expendable; and rely on their gov't to not waste their lives. Mercenaries don't see themselves in that way. The risks they are willing to run are very different; and if the likelihood of death is too high, they quit.
Wagner is a hybrid. They know they are actually an arm of Putin's ambitions; but they've been sent places where the risks are low. Until they were committed to Ukraine. The reason for the recruiting in prisons was to keep the actual soldiers from getting killed in mass charges. But that was only going to work for so long.
That's why Prigozhin was so bellicose about needing more ammo. He didn't mean bullet, he meant artillery, and armor. He has troops who are capable of adapting with reasonable speed; because a lot of them had some experience in Syria, where it's not a one sided shooting gallery.
Problem is Putin wanted something hard to come by; a victory with no hero. Wagner was the only force doing well (if the grinding destruction of Bakhmut could be considered to have "gone well"), but the problem of Putin's succession is ever on his mind ("uneasy lies the head that wears the crown" and all that) means he can't have someone else get a Triumph.
There is also a lot of jockeying in the MoD because nothing is going well. Shoigu is ever at risk of being the next scapegoat (and I think the only reason he's still there is no is willing to accept the risk of being the next failure. Each replacement ups the stakes), etc. So the plan was made to absorb Wagner into the Army; thus removing Prigozhin's relevance/power/income, and THREAT.
So, push came to shove. Someone else might have bolted. Trusted to enough money stashed abroad, and headed someplace safe. But there is no such place. I'm not sure there is anyplace he can go, which is both within reach, and won't extradite him. That's independent of the problem of Putin sending people to kill him. The only other choice was what happened.
Now it's being called a show of force, and attempt to shake up the people keeping the real situation from Putin and demonstrate his loyalty. It wasn't. It was an attempted coup. It went as coups usually do; when they aren't committed without opposition/near the Head of State. An attack was made; everyone got very nervous, most people sat on the sidelines and waited to see who was going to blink first.
The lack of immediate flocking to his banner made Prigozhin decide it wasn't going to work; and I suspect Lukashenko helped that happen by convincing Putin that a lack of immediate force would keep Wagner from feeling cornered. Putin, by not pulling out all the stop managed to look neither scared, nor weak; and avoided tipping his hand. He needed to put Prigozhin in a less liminal space, to remove the romantic aspect, and prevent any appearance of possible success.
What happens next? Prigozhin goes into exile. The troops who moved on Moscow get sent to penal battalions; and probably sent to die in mass assaults. Wagnerites who held the line during the coup get absorbed into the regular army; thus dissolving Wagner (and they probably get broken up, to avoid loci of disaffection).
After that... things are murky. Belarus is an interesting prison, and how Putin takes his revenge isn't clear, but Prigozhin will be made an example of.
*Track 3 on Bad Luck Streak in Dancing School, released 1980