That's not a warplan it's a...
Nov. 21st, 2004 04:07 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
pecuniumLooking at the present planning for the use of the National Guard, I'm worried.
There has been a lot of talk about the need, or lack of it, for more active duty troops. I was mentioned, but not enough, in the campaign. Kerry said we needed two-more divisions, at a total of 40,000 more troops (which really is more on the order of three divisions, but I digress).
The Administration said nonsense (but has been working to actually add 30,000 troops, as Acting Secretary of the Army Brownlee said to the October issue of Soldiers Magazine.
At present the Active Army can't meet the obligations it has. Some of this is systemic. It isn't just numbers, it's organization. The decision was made, under Bush Pere, to reorganise the force, putting a lot of the support elements in the reserve component. This was done to reduce the end strength, save money and keep the crucial services, for a major war, in the service. The idea was, in part, line units need extensive, regular, training to stay in top form. Support can be done with less than perfect peformance, for the a while, as the troops get back up to speed.
It also took advantage of the longer time the average reservist stays in the service.
But it was expected that going to the reserves would be saved for last resorts. The basic model, that the reserves were to fill immediate need, in time of grave emergency, while the country spooled up for full-scale war, wasn't changed.
Until now. Availability Model and Goals
Look at the red quadrant. It says twenty five percent of the Guard will be deployed at any given time.
The Guard. They say it will be one deployment of about 18 months) evey six years. Which means some people will be held past the time their contract expires (deployment stop loss). It means lives on hold, businesses that fail (both the ones owned by Guardsmen, and those which have important people who are in the Guard). Families that suffer.
How they intend to keep the deployments down to one every six years, and keep 25 percent of the troops deployed, I have no idea.
But the seed corn is being eaten fast. People will look at this, and decide to not extend (and the need for MPs, Intel and IS/commo means those, dificult to enlist, slow to be trained; much less skilled, MOSs will get deployed more often, esp. as they were very heavily moved to the Reserves).
Retention will fail, so more of the IRR will be called back to the colors.
And the war, well the war is, unless a whole lot of things change, not going to get any better.
There has been a lot of talk about the need, or lack of it, for more active duty troops. I was mentioned, but not enough, in the campaign. Kerry said we needed two-more divisions, at a total of 40,000 more troops (which really is more on the order of three divisions, but I digress).
The Administration said nonsense (but has been working to actually add 30,000 troops, as Acting Secretary of the Army Brownlee said to the October issue of Soldiers Magazine.
At present the Active Army can't meet the obligations it has. Some of this is systemic. It isn't just numbers, it's organization. The decision was made, under Bush Pere, to reorganise the force, putting a lot of the support elements in the reserve component. This was done to reduce the end strength, save money and keep the crucial services, for a major war, in the service. The idea was, in part, line units need extensive, regular, training to stay in top form. Support can be done with less than perfect peformance, for the a while, as the troops get back up to speed.
It also took advantage of the longer time the average reservist stays in the service.
But it was expected that going to the reserves would be saved for last resorts. The basic model, that the reserves were to fill immediate need, in time of grave emergency, while the country spooled up for full-scale war, wasn't changed.
Until now. Availability Model and Goals
Look at the red quadrant. It says twenty five percent of the Guard will be deployed at any given time.
The Guard. They say it will be one deployment of about 18 months) evey six years. Which means some people will be held past the time their contract expires (deployment stop loss). It means lives on hold, businesses that fail (both the ones owned by Guardsmen, and those which have important people who are in the Guard). Families that suffer.
How they intend to keep the deployments down to one every six years, and keep 25 percent of the troops deployed, I have no idea.
But the seed corn is being eaten fast. People will look at this, and decide to not extend (and the need for MPs, Intel and IS/commo means those, dificult to enlist, slow to be trained; much less skilled, MOSs will get deployed more often, esp. as they were very heavily moved to the Reserves).
Retention will fail, so more of the IRR will be called back to the colors.
And the war, well the war is, unless a whole lot of things change, not going to get any better.
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no subject
Date: 2004-11-22 04:29 pm (UTC)That said, if the government took all the money that it would cost to reinstate and then run the draft and put it into better benefits for military people and their families, would the enlistment and retention rates increase sufficiently?