I ya gotta be a loon....

[pecunium]

I am glad I happen to be this one:


Which Historical Lunatic Are You?
From the fecund loins of Rum and Monkey.


On the other hand... this loon Scalia on orgies and the 17th amendment (no, I'm not kidding)

Comments

[patgreene.livejournal.com]

Interesting.... we need to get a orgy case up before the court. see what he would do. And the 17th Amendment thing was just.... bizarre. Although I would be interested in hearing his reasoning on that one.

[pecunium.livejournal.com]

I think I can see it (and if I had more faith in the system, I'd agree with him).

The legislative was meant to have an internal set of checks. The House was meant to be responsive to the people, and that's part of why the two-year term. The immediate needs of the region the constituents will change that quickly.

The senators were to answer the larger needs of the states, and so they were appointed by an intermediate layer, the form of the State's legislature.

Now, if the legislature weren't beholden to special interests, if the party in power wouldn't make certain the Senators were of the "correct" stripe, if any number of things weren't going to cause this to make the senators, not the representatives of the state, but rather some private interest, then it would be better for them to not have to fight so much to keep their seats (because as much as 20 percent of the time they might be considering real matters of governance they are campainging) and not (though this might seem counter-intuitive) lose much of the advantage of incumbency.


TK

[allucquere.livejournal.com]

"Although I would be interested in hearing his reasoning on that one."


The 17th is actually a hot issue among the legalista right now. Here's a link for you:

http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/09/17/fl.dean.17th.amendment/

Of course, this article glosses over the larger argument FOR the 17th Amendment. Basically, because the constitution made individual senators more powerful that individual representatives, their election was too important to be left to state legislators (who were believed to be generally less professional and more prone to bribery than federal congressmen.)

[pecunium.livejournal.com]

The arguments for, and against, are all sort of silly, because the people aren't professional at all. There is a merit to thinking it harder to, "bribe," the mass of the people, than it would be to make an actual quid pro quo with enough state legislators to get oneself in.

The problem with this is that, even in those states with part time legislatures, the legislators are fairly professional, so we get ideology as the driving force, you'd never see contests like the recent one in SD, because the question of whom to replace a senator with wouldn't come up, at least not in a public way.

Such things as Jeffords crossing the aisle, and keeping his, wouldn't happen. Looking at the pattern in local (as opposed to national) office, and cheating a bit; using the House as a bellweather, the shifts in percieved (as opposed to actual) interest occaisioned by the media campaigns of the right would have a senate nowhere near divided.

Which would make for a more drastic effect on the national direction than the present levels of gerrymandering and incumbment security have. Becauase the senate approves the judiciary.

Beacuse that article glosses a couple of facts, the most telling being his interpretation of the methodology, and reasoning, behind the spate of, "states' rights" decisions being presently enacted buy this, very activist court.

This court is not interested in States' rights, it is interested in removing a large number of the social programs which have been ushered in since the progressive movement got the direct election of senators.

It is also interested in reducing a large number of the civil rights explicitly protected by legislation, and previous decisions of The Court. It's been doing this under the rubric of states's rights, but actually removing the power of both states and the federal governments' ability to actively guarantee those rights, and by refusing to admit that the 9th amendment justifies such things as a right to privacy, and to equal pay and to not be harrassed for being a mormon, or gay, or white, or married.

I think (my cynical self to the fore) that Scalia assumes a repeal of the 17th, would make a moderate court an impossibilty, and in our immediate lifetime, regardless of who the president was, because the senate would be Republican, by more than 2/3rds.

A scary prospect, no matter which side of the aisle one is one, because an overriding majority is evil in opposition, and reckless in power.

TK

[allucquere.livejournal.com]

"This court is not interested in States' rights, it is interested in removing a large number of the social programs which have been ushered in since the progressive movement got the direct election of senators."

Yes, exactly. These arguments are just a way of halting federal freedom guarantees. How many regular joes really have the same state vs. federal concerns prevalent 200 years ago?

I occasionally have mixed feelings on the direct/indirect democracy issue, but only right after some yahoo tells me that yes, he lost his job and his kid is in Iraq, but he's voting for Bush because because he seems like a "good guy."

Indirect never worked as well as it should because career politicians can't afford to vote their heart and mind...not if they want to protect their constiuents in the seniority-based, pork-laden system that presides at the state and federal levels.

Aside: I'd like to add your journal, OK?

[pecunium.livejournal.com]

Sure, add away.

I'm of mixed opinions on the issues of direct vs. indirect democracy. Historical models imply that anything larger than about 5,000 people fall apart if the democratic function is direct (note that neither Britain, nor the States, which have the longest histories of democratic institutions; of present nations, saving Iceland, which is anomalous, in so many ways, do not have directly democratic systems. They elect people to represent them).

So the question becomes, at what level does one place the removal. The problem with professional lawmakers isn't that they are professional, it's that to get/stay on office anymore requires large amounts of capital. Which restricts access to office to those who are either well off, or can pander to those who are.

If that can be fixed, a lot of the problems would be fixed, and this question could be shelved.

TK