Thoughts while stealing time
Sep. 24th, 2005 01:54 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
pecuniumMy father is getting a mineral spa hot soak and massage, so I am using the time to noodle on the web.
Which led to my finding Why we think it better to free the guilty than convict the innocent.pdf, by Humphey Vermont.
I have a real problem with the argument (which is probably getting more play than it might because The Volokh Conspiracy, is touting it. Given that Sasha wrote an article [ten years ago, where does the time fly] for the Pennsylvania University Law Review on the subject n guilty men it's a topic they care about, though it seems to the opposite conclusion) that,"The conclusion is that we over-weight the harm of false conviction".
See, the thing which matters to me isn't punishment, it isn't deterrence, it isn't making the victim's, or their families, feel better; it's justice.
Taking an innocent's liberty, because it makes the system more, "efficient," is a non-starter. Do I value locking up the guilty? Sure, but less than I value seeing the innocent aqcuitted.
Vermont asks, offers examples of things alleged to show biases. On of these is,
Directness of harm is a proxy for these distinctions and likewise accounts for most variation in
the omission bias. When one option is an omission that results in indirect harm and the other
option is an act that results in equally indirect harm, the omission bias is very small. Royzman
and Baron conclude that the omissio n bias is largely an “indirectness bias.” They also find that
a subtle difference in directness is enough to render one option more attractive than the other.
In one experiment, they asked subjects to imagine themselves as public health officials on an
island in the South Pacific. The island is facing an outbreak of a disease that causes death in
children under the age of 12. Many children on the island are already infected and beyond help.
If nothing is done, many more children will become infected and die.
The subjects were given the following options.
· Release special “lethal fumes” into the air. This will kill all of the children
who are already infected, checking any further spread of the disease and
saving the still uninfected children.
· Release special “immunizing fumes” into the air. This will confer
immunity to the disease in all those who are not yet infected. However, the
fumes will kill all of the children who are already infected.
Subjects strongly preferred the option to release “immunizing fumes.” The harm from releasing
“lethal fumes” is regarded as more direct because the harm is part of the act itself, i.e., the harm
is part and parcel of the good outcome."
Given those two choices I am among those choosing the "immunizing fumes" option. Not because I am choosing the passive death of the second, but rather the active protection in the future. In the first option if the disease were to return I would again have to kill a lot of kids, but with the second, such a terrible thing need not be repeated.
He makes the following claim about my thinking,
It is hard to imagine getting rid of the harm and keeping the good outcome. The harm is instrumental
to the good outcome. In contrast, in the “immunizing fumes” option the harm is incidental to the
good outcome. The act (releasing fumes) has two effects: the good outcome (checking spread of
disease) and the harmful side effect (killing infected children). We can easily imagine getting rid
of the harm and keeping the good outcome. Even though the scenario does not allow it, the
ability to imagine it appears to render the indirect option more attractive.
Which is not the case, if I had the choices given (no way to avoid the deaths, in this instance, of the infected, I'll take the second, because it is affirmative for the future. As such it is best choice, not merely the one with the better phrasing of options.
He extrapolates (or infers the societal moral calculus, as he doesn't speak for me in this regard), "
We do not regard all strictly relevant actors as morally relevant. An execution, for instance, is an act that
causes direct harm. But each execution prevents as many as (let’s assume) 18 acts of murder and
each of those murders would cause as much direct harm as one execution. If omission bias and
preference for indirect harm were based solely on desire to minimize the overall amount of direct
harm caused by acts – regardless of who the actor is or from whose act the harm is direct –
omission bias and preference for indirect harm would militate in favor of capital punishment.
Instead, in this and other criminal justice scenarios, the omission bias and preference for indirect
harm operate mainly with respect to harmful acts of government as opposed to the harmful acts
of anonymous laypersons. (he uses a reference to a study citing that 18 prevented figure elsewhere [cite Shepherd and others.] and so presumes to make it seem more factual, without more than this reference to "Shepard and others).
By extension, what it all amounts to is saying we don't need to worry about convicting the innocent, because the harms of acquitting the accused are dead equal, and punishment is better than justice.
He goes on to say (and he is correct) the odds are greater for a false acquittal than a false conviction, which changes not at all the idea that a false conviction is unjust, and (see "n guilty men") that it is better to let "x" guilty men go free than to convict a single innocent.
To argue otherwise is unjust, which he does, in a left-handed way in the last footnote, "More generally, the good reasons do not seem to justify the strength of the burden of proof in western countries today. See generally Samson Vermont, The Value of Accuracy Revisited (working paper)
Peter asked Jesus, how many times he should forgive one who sins against one, Jesus answer was seventy times seven", and I think a high burden of proof is probably a decent approximation of that level of mercy.
Which led to my finding Why we think it better to free the guilty than convict the innocent.pdf, by Humphey Vermont.
I have a real problem with the argument (which is probably getting more play than it might because The Volokh Conspiracy, is touting it. Given that Sasha wrote an article [ten years ago, where does the time fly] for the Pennsylvania University Law Review on the subject n guilty men it's a topic they care about, though it seems to the opposite conclusion) that,"The conclusion is that we over-weight the harm of false conviction".
See, the thing which matters to me isn't punishment, it isn't deterrence, it isn't making the victim's, or their families, feel better; it's justice.
Taking an innocent's liberty, because it makes the system more, "efficient," is a non-starter. Do I value locking up the guilty? Sure, but less than I value seeing the innocent aqcuitted.
Vermont asks, offers examples of things alleged to show biases. On of these is,
Directness of harm is a proxy for these distinctions and likewise accounts for most variation in
the omission bias. When one option is an omission that results in indirect harm and the other
option is an act that results in equally indirect harm, the omission bias is very small. Royzman
and Baron conclude that the omissio n bias is largely an “indirectness bias.” They also find that
a subtle difference in directness is enough to render one option more attractive than the other.
In one experiment, they asked subjects to imagine themselves as public health officials on an
island in the South Pacific. The island is facing an outbreak of a disease that causes death in
children under the age of 12. Many children on the island are already infected and beyond help.
If nothing is done, many more children will become infected and die.
The subjects were given the following options.
· Release special “lethal fumes” into the air. This will kill all of the children
who are already infected, checking any further spread of the disease and
saving the still uninfected children.
· Release special “immunizing fumes” into the air. This will confer
immunity to the disease in all those who are not yet infected. However, the
fumes will kill all of the children who are already infected.
Subjects strongly preferred the option to release “immunizing fumes.” The harm from releasing
“lethal fumes” is regarded as more direct because the harm is part of the act itself, i.e., the harm
is part and parcel of the good outcome."
Given those two choices I am among those choosing the "immunizing fumes" option. Not because I am choosing the passive death of the second, but rather the active protection in the future. In the first option if the disease were to return I would again have to kill a lot of kids, but with the second, such a terrible thing need not be repeated.
He makes the following claim about my thinking,
It is hard to imagine getting rid of the harm and keeping the good outcome. The harm is instrumental
to the good outcome. In contrast, in the “immunizing fumes” option the harm is incidental to the
good outcome. The act (releasing fumes) has two effects: the good outcome (checking spread of
disease) and the harmful side effect (killing infected children). We can easily imagine getting rid
of the harm and keeping the good outcome. Even though the scenario does not allow it, the
ability to imagine it appears to render the indirect option more attractive.
Which is not the case, if I had the choices given (no way to avoid the deaths, in this instance, of the infected, I'll take the second, because it is affirmative for the future. As such it is best choice, not merely the one with the better phrasing of options.
He extrapolates (or infers the societal moral calculus, as he doesn't speak for me in this regard), "
We do not regard all strictly relevant actors as morally relevant. An execution, for instance, is an act that
causes direct harm. But each execution prevents as many as (let’s assume) 18 acts of murder and
each of those murders would cause as much direct harm as one execution. If omission bias and
preference for indirect harm were based solely on desire to minimize the overall amount of direct
harm caused by acts – regardless of who the actor is or from whose act the harm is direct –
omission bias and preference for indirect harm would militate in favor of capital punishment.
Instead, in this and other criminal justice scenarios, the omission bias and preference for indirect
harm operate mainly with respect to harmful acts of government as opposed to the harmful acts
of anonymous laypersons. (he uses a reference to a study citing that 18 prevented figure elsewhere [cite Shepherd and others.] and so presumes to make it seem more factual, without more than this reference to "Shepard and others).
By extension, what it all amounts to is saying we don't need to worry about convicting the innocent, because the harms of acquitting the accused are dead equal, and punishment is better than justice.
He goes on to say (and he is correct) the odds are greater for a false acquittal than a false conviction, which changes not at all the idea that a false conviction is unjust, and (see "n guilty men") that it is better to let "x" guilty men go free than to convict a single innocent.
To argue otherwise is unjust, which he does, in a left-handed way in the last footnote, "More generally, the good reasons do not seem to justify the strength of the burden of proof in western countries today. See generally Samson Vermont, The Value of Accuracy Revisited (working paper)
Peter asked Jesus, how many times he should forgive one who sins against one, Jesus answer was seventy times seven", and I think a high burden of proof is probably a decent approximation of that level of mercy.
![[identity profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/openid.png){kind=small}
no subject
Date: 2005-09-26 04:35 am (UTC)He accepts that some innocents may have to suffer. If he is honest, there isn't a difference between himself, his son, you, or any other innocent.
You can't condemn him because he applied his values to the limited set you offered and you don't like the answer he gave to that limited set.
If one is to give him the benefit of the doubt, he gave an honest answer and would, were it rephrased, be willing to put himself in the clink, not merely for the saving of his son (which many will claim) but for the common good.
TK
no subject
Date: 2005-09-26 03:22 pm (UTC)