Thoughts while stealing time
Sep. 24th, 2005 01:54 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
pecuniumMy father is getting a mineral spa hot soak and massage, so I am using the time to noodle on the web.
Which led to my finding Why we think it better to free the guilty than convict the innocent.pdf, by Humphey Vermont.
I have a real problem with the argument (which is probably getting more play than it might because The Volokh Conspiracy, is touting it. Given that Sasha wrote an article [ten years ago, where does the time fly] for the Pennsylvania University Law Review on the subject n guilty men it's a topic they care about, though it seems to the opposite conclusion) that,"The conclusion is that we over-weight the harm of false conviction".
See, the thing which matters to me isn't punishment, it isn't deterrence, it isn't making the victim's, or their families, feel better; it's justice.
Taking an innocent's liberty, because it makes the system more, "efficient," is a non-starter. Do I value locking up the guilty? Sure, but less than I value seeing the innocent aqcuitted.
Vermont asks, offers examples of things alleged to show biases. On of these is,
Directness of harm is a proxy for these distinctions and likewise accounts for most variation in
the omission bias. When one option is an omission that results in indirect harm and the other
option is an act that results in equally indirect harm, the omission bias is very small. Royzman
and Baron conclude that the omissio n bias is largely an “indirectness bias.” They also find that
a subtle difference in directness is enough to render one option more attractive than the other.
In one experiment, they asked subjects to imagine themselves as public health officials on an
island in the South Pacific. The island is facing an outbreak of a disease that causes death in
children under the age of 12. Many children on the island are already infected and beyond help.
If nothing is done, many more children will become infected and die.
The subjects were given the following options.
· Release special “lethal fumes” into the air. This will kill all of the children
who are already infected, checking any further spread of the disease and
saving the still uninfected children.
· Release special “immunizing fumes” into the air. This will confer
immunity to the disease in all those who are not yet infected. However, the
fumes will kill all of the children who are already infected.
Subjects strongly preferred the option to release “immunizing fumes.” The harm from releasing
“lethal fumes” is regarded as more direct because the harm is part of the act itself, i.e., the harm
is part and parcel of the good outcome."
Given those two choices I am among those choosing the "immunizing fumes" option. Not because I am choosing the passive death of the second, but rather the active protection in the future. In the first option if the disease were to return I would again have to kill a lot of kids, but with the second, such a terrible thing need not be repeated.
He makes the following claim about my thinking,
It is hard to imagine getting rid of the harm and keeping the good outcome. The harm is instrumental
to the good outcome. In contrast, in the “immunizing fumes” option the harm is incidental to the
good outcome. The act (releasing fumes) has two effects: the good outcome (checking spread of
disease) and the harmful side effect (killing infected children). We can easily imagine getting rid
of the harm and keeping the good outcome. Even though the scenario does not allow it, the
ability to imagine it appears to render the indirect option more attractive.
Which is not the case, if I had the choices given (no way to avoid the deaths, in this instance, of the infected, I'll take the second, because it is affirmative for the future. As such it is best choice, not merely the one with the better phrasing of options.
He extrapolates (or infers the societal moral calculus, as he doesn't speak for me in this regard), "
We do not regard all strictly relevant actors as morally relevant. An execution, for instance, is an act that
causes direct harm. But each execution prevents as many as (let’s assume) 18 acts of murder and
each of those murders would cause as much direct harm as one execution. If omission bias and
preference for indirect harm were based solely on desire to minimize the overall amount of direct
harm caused by acts – regardless of who the actor is or from whose act the harm is direct –
omission bias and preference for indirect harm would militate in favor of capital punishment.
Instead, in this and other criminal justice scenarios, the omission bias and preference for indirect
harm operate mainly with respect to harmful acts of government as opposed to the harmful acts
of anonymous laypersons. (he uses a reference to a study citing that 18 prevented figure elsewhere [cite Shepherd and others.] and so presumes to make it seem more factual, without more than this reference to "Shepard and others).
By extension, what it all amounts to is saying we don't need to worry about convicting the innocent, because the harms of acquitting the accused are dead equal, and punishment is better than justice.
He goes on to say (and he is correct) the odds are greater for a false acquittal than a false conviction, which changes not at all the idea that a false conviction is unjust, and (see "n guilty men") that it is better to let "x" guilty men go free than to convict a single innocent.
To argue otherwise is unjust, which he does, in a left-handed way in the last footnote, "More generally, the good reasons do not seem to justify the strength of the burden of proof in western countries today. See generally Samson Vermont, The Value of Accuracy Revisited (working paper)
Peter asked Jesus, how many times he should forgive one who sins against one, Jesus answer was seventy times seven", and I think a high burden of proof is probably a decent approximation of that level of mercy.
Which led to my finding Why we think it better to free the guilty than convict the innocent.pdf, by Humphey Vermont.
I have a real problem with the argument (which is probably getting more play than it might because The Volokh Conspiracy, is touting it. Given that Sasha wrote an article [ten years ago, where does the time fly] for the Pennsylvania University Law Review on the subject n guilty men it's a topic they care about, though it seems to the opposite conclusion) that,"The conclusion is that we over-weight the harm of false conviction".
See, the thing which matters to me isn't punishment, it isn't deterrence, it isn't making the victim's, or their families, feel better; it's justice.
Taking an innocent's liberty, because it makes the system more, "efficient," is a non-starter. Do I value locking up the guilty? Sure, but less than I value seeing the innocent aqcuitted.
Vermont asks, offers examples of things alleged to show biases. On of these is,
Directness of harm is a proxy for these distinctions and likewise accounts for most variation in
the omission bias. When one option is an omission that results in indirect harm and the other
option is an act that results in equally indirect harm, the omission bias is very small. Royzman
and Baron conclude that the omissio n bias is largely an “indirectness bias.” They also find that
a subtle difference in directness is enough to render one option more attractive than the other.
In one experiment, they asked subjects to imagine themselves as public health officials on an
island in the South Pacific. The island is facing an outbreak of a disease that causes death in
children under the age of 12. Many children on the island are already infected and beyond help.
If nothing is done, many more children will become infected and die.
The subjects were given the following options.
· Release special “lethal fumes” into the air. This will kill all of the children
who are already infected, checking any further spread of the disease and
saving the still uninfected children.
· Release special “immunizing fumes” into the air. This will confer
immunity to the disease in all those who are not yet infected. However, the
fumes will kill all of the children who are already infected.
Subjects strongly preferred the option to release “immunizing fumes.” The harm from releasing
“lethal fumes” is regarded as more direct because the harm is part of the act itself, i.e., the harm
is part and parcel of the good outcome."
Given those two choices I am among those choosing the "immunizing fumes" option. Not because I am choosing the passive death of the second, but rather the active protection in the future. In the first option if the disease were to return I would again have to kill a lot of kids, but with the second, such a terrible thing need not be repeated.
He makes the following claim about my thinking,
It is hard to imagine getting rid of the harm and keeping the good outcome. The harm is instrumental
to the good outcome. In contrast, in the “immunizing fumes” option the harm is incidental to the
good outcome. The act (releasing fumes) has two effects: the good outcome (checking spread of
disease) and the harmful side effect (killing infected children). We can easily imagine getting rid
of the harm and keeping the good outcome. Even though the scenario does not allow it, the
ability to imagine it appears to render the indirect option more attractive.
Which is not the case, if I had the choices given (no way to avoid the deaths, in this instance, of the infected, I'll take the second, because it is affirmative for the future. As such it is best choice, not merely the one with the better phrasing of options.
He extrapolates (or infers the societal moral calculus, as he doesn't speak for me in this regard), "
We do not regard all strictly relevant actors as morally relevant. An execution, for instance, is an act that
causes direct harm. But each execution prevents as many as (let’s assume) 18 acts of murder and
each of those murders would cause as much direct harm as one execution. If omission bias and
preference for indirect harm were based solely on desire to minimize the overall amount of direct
harm caused by acts – regardless of who the actor is or from whose act the harm is direct –
omission bias and preference for indirect harm would militate in favor of capital punishment.
Instead, in this and other criminal justice scenarios, the omission bias and preference for indirect
harm operate mainly with respect to harmful acts of government as opposed to the harmful acts
of anonymous laypersons. (he uses a reference to a study citing that 18 prevented figure elsewhere [cite Shepherd and others.] and so presumes to make it seem more factual, without more than this reference to "Shepard and others).
By extension, what it all amounts to is saying we don't need to worry about convicting the innocent, because the harms of acquitting the accused are dead equal, and punishment is better than justice.
He goes on to say (and he is correct) the odds are greater for a false acquittal than a false conviction, which changes not at all the idea that a false conviction is unjust, and (see "n guilty men") that it is better to let "x" guilty men go free than to convict a single innocent.
To argue otherwise is unjust, which he does, in a left-handed way in the last footnote, "More generally, the good reasons do not seem to justify the strength of the burden of proof in western countries today. See generally Samson Vermont, The Value of Accuracy Revisited (working paper)
Peter asked Jesus, how many times he should forgive one who sins against one, Jesus answer was seventy times seven", and I think a high burden of proof is probably a decent approximation of that level of mercy.
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You do realize you just embraced the worst of communism?
Date: 2005-09-26 02:09 am (UTC)CS Lewis, in "The World's Last Night," an essay I can find very little if anything to take exception to (anomalously), asks in turn, what value would your
sacrificingkilling real, living children to protect hypothetical future children have, and what moral justification for your deed, if objectively it were the case that The Asteroid was heading for us and there would be no future generations? All your consequentialism is rendered meaningless.But then, this is simply turning consequentialism and relativism back on itself. The real problem, to my thinking, is that this argument, killing a few diseased children to protect the healthy rest, is absolutely no different from that which certain civilized Volks thought their duty, to remove from the population certain small diseased segments of humanity, to protect the rest from the contamination of Untermenschen genes and culture...
But they were wrong! you say. So you say. But plenty still today would argue that you have been driven mad by such contamination already. And what if a better, wiser doctor were to show after the fact that, far from repeating itself, the disease in fact upon more thorough study simply breeds immunity? What would all your sorrow and real, if specious, remorse accomplish, or be worth, at that point?
I certainly hope your "morality" is never put in charge of the world's population's fate.
Re: You do realize you just embraced the worst of communism?
Date: 2005-09-26 02:32 am (UTC)Because if it is, it misses the mark.
Given a trio of choices, which is what the hypothetical posed does (1: let the disease; contagious, and fatal to all who contract it [the use of children in the example given is an emotional red-herring meant to make the choice seem more poignant... or perhaps as phrased it was meant to place the decider out of personal harm and so change the calculous, not having access to the study I can't say, but the former seems more likely to me] run its various courses. 2: treat it with one of two methods, neither of which saves anyone presently infected; one of which prevents all the presently non-infected from getting it in the event of recurrunce.
If I am limited to those three choices there is no question which I am going to do.
The question is false, and falsely constrained. There is also the subtle difference of this problem not being limited to one subset of the population. It isn't just Jews who are sick (or homosexuals or gyspies, or, or, or) but rather a neutral; as presented, cross-section of all the people.
You may hope all you like, but the facts are that, given a choice of the least of three evils, and no way to avoid choosing one, I will, every time, take the least.
If you think it better to risk the death of all, to not save some who will die regardless (because that was the question posed) because that makes you feel better because you have kept active blodd from your hands, well we disasgree.
The disease, as given has a 100 percent mortality. There is, as given, no way to save the infected. The question was which of the two ways available is to be preferred. You castigate me, nay condemn, because I didn't offer a Kobayashi Maru solution and rewrite the question.
I don't know what I might do if faced with something like an ebola (90 percent mortality) were runnig pandemic. Probably advocate quarantine.
But that wasn't the question asked, so it wasn't an available option in context.
TK
Re: You do realize you just embraced the worst of communism?
Date: 2005-09-26 10:09 am (UTC)Slaughter innocents today to bring the blessings of good life to future generations.
It says a lot about the people who constructed the test scenario. So far I had mostly seen it as mind-boggling stupid (you have an airborne vaccination life-saving for some but lethal to others and can't find a way to expose selectively? WTF?) but one could probably also see it as simply callous or plain evil.
Re: You do realize you just embraced the worst of communism?
Date: 2005-09-26 02:24 pm (UTC)The question (in my mind) which would answer the relevance of the information sought was how man, different, sets of questions with similar shades of perceived harm.
Here are the structures of the hypothetical, broken down.
A disease is running it's course.
It is 100 percent lethal those who contract it.
The group capable of contracting it is restricted by age.
It is contagious.
A vaccine exists, but it can't save those who are infected; rather it kills them immediately.
+++++
So far so good. Given that set you quarantine everyone. Now comes the hard part. If it were me, well those who were obviously infected... do nothing. Treat the symptoms and hope some recover.
The rest, the asymptomatic, if they've been exposed and they get the vaccine, they have no hope. If they've not they get protected. How to choose, what's the calculus. The factors in play (rate of contagion, legnth of time from infection to transmissibility, level of contagion [AIDS isn't trivially contagious, so this problem; though some have so argued, doesn't arise, not even to the level of needing quarantine] speed of progress, &c., &c, &c.) would have to be looked at.
But the world of such surveys is clean. The dirty details get left out in the search for whatever Truth is being sought. I should like to think the entire study this was lifted from was better built than this piece implies, and that it was lifted out of context, and thus bent to serve the ill-intent of this author, but I suspect it was just this shoddy from front to back.
TK